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I. INTRODUCTION

A parent's worst nightmare is to be permanently separated from her
child. A child's worst fear is that someone will come and take his
parents away. In the home, a child forms his perception of the world.
He learns that it is fair or unfair, cruel or kind, civilized or barbaric.
*

J.D. candidate May 2004, University of San Diego School of Law.

What kind of psychological rift results when a government separates
thousands of children from their parents and places them hundreds of
miles away in a foreign land? This is the question many are asking in
the wake of a recent court decision in Hong Kong.
The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal's January 10, 2002, ruling on
the Right of Abode is the beginning of the end of Constitutional and
human rights in Hong Kong. In Ng Siu Tung & Others v. Director of
Immigration,' the Court of Final Appeal (The Court) affirmed that
nearly 7,000 Chinese lost the right to live with their families in the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong) because, unlike their
family members, they were born on the mainland.2 These mainlandborn Chinese had until March 31, 2002, to voluntarily return to the
mainland or face forcible deportation. Because of the January 10, 2002,
ruling, claimants lost a right that had been given to them in the Hong
Kong constitution, formerly granted by the Court itself, and promised by
the Hong Kong Government. The Court's reversal trammeled the
legitimate expectations and human rights of thousands of Right of Abode
claimants. It also affirmed the Court's retraction of its bold claim of judicial
review over the National People's Congress Standing Committee' 3
(Standing Committee).4
Lin Yeung Ming and her twin sister Yuk-oi face forcible separation as
a result of the Court's ruling. 5 Yeung Ming must return to the mainland

1. Ng Siu Tung & Others v. Dir. of Immigr., [2002] 1 Hong Kong Legal Reports
& Digest [H. K. Legal Rep. & Dig.] 561.
2. Damien Grammaticas, Hong Kong Families Stage Vigil, (BBC News television
broadcast, Mar. 31, 2002), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asiapacific/I 903299.stm.
3. The Standing Committee is the center of power in the Chinese government.
"All members of the Standing Committee are members of the Communist Party.
Supreme power is held by the Standing Committee (of around six to eight persons, who
are also the key power brokers)." "The Party's organization is parallel to state
institutions, as has been indicated above. At each level it is the Party body, and not the
corresponding state organ, which makes the key decisions and supervises their
implementation. There is a significant overlap of membership as well, which ensures the
dominant role in state institutions to the Party leaders." YASH GHAI, HONG KONG'S NEW
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: THE RESUMPTION OF CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIC
LAW 108 (2d ed. 1999).

4. Ng Ka Ling & Others v. Dir. of Immigr., [1999] 1 H. K. Legal Rep. & Dig.
577 (holding for the first time that it had the power of judicial review even over the
Standing Committee).
5. In 1996 Yeung Ming lost her chance to settle in Hong Kong when authorities
forced her parents to choose only one twin daughter to follow them to Hong Kong. In
July 1999 she came to Hong Kong on a two-way permit and appealed her status. The
January 10, 2002, ruling permanently denied her a right of abode in Hong Kong and the
ability to live with the rest of her family. The twins' story gained much publicity after
the ruling. Stella Lee, Twins Face Pain of Second Separation, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Jan. 24, 2002, available at www.scmp.com/.
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after losing her appeal to stay in Hong Kong.6 Lam Ka Ming, twenty,
must return to the mainland while his six-year old sister Lam Ming-Sing
stays in Hong Kong with their parents.7 A seventy-two-year-old man
must leave his sick ninety-five-year-old father to care for himself in
Hong Kong alone. 8 A distraught mother and her mainland-born son
knelt on the steps of the Central Government Offices after the ruling,9
begging Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa not to separate them.
Hundreds of protesters staged hunger strikes, and four thousand held a
candlelight vigil refusing to voluntarily return to the mainland as the
deadline loomed over them.10 Incidents of violence also followed the
ruling, 11 Many claimants planned to hide illegally in Hong Kong. 12
Thousands appealed to the United Nations for help. The U.N. Economic
and Social Council responded by releasing a written statement on
January 31, 2002, citing Article 10 of the International Covenant on
Social and Cultural rights: 13 "the widest possible protection and assistance
should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental
group unit of society."' 14 The Council directly urged the Government of
Hong Kong to "urgently consider granting Right of Abode to all of those
who lost their court case and allow them to remain in Hong Kong with
their families on humanitarian grounds."' 15 The United Nation's request
has so far been ignored by the Hong Kong government, which began to
forcibly deport Right of Abode claimants after March 31, 2002, as
promised.
This Comment argues that the Court's refusal to sidestep the Standing
Committee's reinterpretation using either the Doctrine of Legitimate
6.

Id.

7.

Magdalen Chow & Patsy Moy, Best of Times and Worst of Times in a Tale of
available at

Two Children, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 11, 2002,
http://www.special.scmp.com/rightofabode/main/ZZZGHG3M5WC.html.
8.

S. CHINA MORNING POST, available at www.scmp.com.

9.

Id.

10.

Grammaticas, supra note 2.

11. Jury told of 'roast pig' threat to officers, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 2,
2002, availableat www.scmp.com.
12. Chow & Moy, supra note 7, availableat http://special.scmp.com/rightofabode/
main/ZZZGHG3M5WC.html.
13. U.N. ESCOR, 58th Sess., Written statement submitted by the Asian Legal
Resource Center (ALRC) at 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/NGO/69 (2002) (quoting
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art.
10(1) 993 U.N.T.S. 171).
14.

Id.

15.

Id.

Expectation, or the "judgments previously rendered" clause in the Basic
Law, signifies its capitulation to the Standing Committee, and its

inability to protect constitutional rights and/or human rights in Hong
Kong. This Comment will first give a brief background on the concept
of "One Country, Two Systems" and the drafting of the Basic Law.
Second, it will introduce the Right of Abode cases, and explain the
constitutional crisis of 1999. Third, it analyzes Ng Siu Tung & Others v.
Director of Immigration, decided on January 10, 2002, and its failure to
legitimately sidestep the Standing Committee's reinterpretation in the

name of human rights.

Finally, this Comment concludes that the

independence of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal has been
irrevocably compromised, constitutional rights are mutable under the
Basic Law (Hong Kong Constitution), and human rights will not be
meaningfully protected by the courts of Hong Kong.
II. ONE COUNTRY, Two SYSTEMS 16
To preserve Hong Kong's prosperous economy while incorporating
China's sovereignty, 17 China and Great Britain devised a plan for the
reunification of Hong Kong and China called "One Country, Two

16. Comparisons are often drawn between the relationships of Hong Kong, Macau,
and Taiwan to China. For a discussion regarding the effect of Ng Ka Ling & Others v.
Dir. of Immigr. on Macau, see Judith R. Krebs, One Country, Three Systems? Judicial
Review In Macau After Ng Ka Ling, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y 111 (2000). For a
comparison of Macau's and Hong Kong's histories as Special Administrative Regions
and discussions of China's attempts to infringe upon their relative autonomies, see
Frances M. Luke, The Imminent Threat of China's Intervention in Macau's Autonomy:
Using Hong Kong's Past to Secure Macau's Future, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 717 (2000).
For a discussion comparing and contrasting Hong Kong and Taiwan, see Sean Cooney,
Why Taiwan Is Not Hong Kong: A Review of the PRC's "One Country Two Systems"
Model for Reunification with Taiwan, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'y 497 (1997).
17. For many years China has harbored intense bitterness toward Great Britain for
taking Hong Kong in 1842 with the Treaty of Nanking and Kowloon in 1898 with the
Convention of Peking. Before the Opium Wars, China had believed it was the center of
the world and that its emperor ruled the world. China did not view Great Britain as its
equal and thus was shamed by Great Britain's superior military strength. China's
surrender of Hong Kong and Kowloon was a humiliating defeat, which has never been
forgotten. Because of this, the reunification with Hong Kong had great symbolic
significance to China. China wanted the reunification to go smoothly, and for Hong
Kong to once again be a part of the motherland. GHAI, supra note 3, at 1-12. Yash Ghai
is the Sir Y.K. Pao Professor Of Public Law at the University of Hong Kong, having
previously taught at the universities of East Africa (Dar es Salaam), Uppsala and
Warwick. He has been a visiting professor at several universities, including Harvard,
Yale, Wisconsin, Melbourne, Toronto, London and the South Pacific, the National
University of Singapore, and the National Law School of India. He has published
extensively on comparative public law, human rights, ethnic relations, state-owned
companies, and the sociology of law. He has advised a number of states and political
parties on the drafting and reforms of constitutions.
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Systems."' 18 Under this plan, Hong Kong would once again be a art of
the motherland, but would maintain a "high degree of autonomy" 9 as a
Special Administrative Region of China. Hong Kong would keep its
capitalist economic system, its common law legal system, and its own
final court of appeal, so long as this did not conflict with Chinese sovereignty.
Like an adult child moving back home to live with her parents, Hong
Kong could enjoy its freedom so long as it did not disturb the household.
Putting such a hybrid creature together was not easy. China's legal
system is markedly different from the system Hong Kong had developed
while under British rule. The constitutional system of the People's
Republic of China (herein "PRC") can best be'described as a "vertical"
system. 2' Yash Ghai describes it as a "pyramidal structure" where power
funnels up from the many to the few, and "the most powerful bodies are
also the smallest., 22 China rejects the idea of separation of powers
because the concept was condemned by Marx and Lenin as a device for
bourgeois rule.23
The theoretical basis for state power in China is the Doctrine of
Democratic Centralism, 24 which consists of two rules. First, "decisions
are made after consultations with various groups and organizations, but
once made, they have to be strictly observed by all concerned. 25
Second, "the individual should be subordinated to the organization; the
18.

Id. at 48-51.

19.
Id. at 139; see CONSULTATIVE COMMITrEE, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: THE
BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S

REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 2 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1511 (1990) [hereinafter THE
BASIC LAW].
20. Id. at 56 (quoting ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [Constitution] art.
31(2) (1982) [hereinafter PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CONST.] ("The state may

establish special administrative regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in
special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the National
People's Congress in the light of the specific conditions.") [hereinafter NPC]). The

NPC is specifically

given power to "decide on the establishment of special
Id.(quoting PEOPLE'S

administrative regions and the systems to be instituted there."
REPUBLIC OF CHINA CONST. art. 62(13)).

21. Byron Weng, The Clash of Two Legal Cultures: Between the Court of Final
Appeal and the Standing Committee of the NPC, CSIS, Mar. 1, 1999, availableat http://
www.csis.org/asia/hkupdate/hkl5bw.html. Byron Weng is chairman of the Department
of Government and Public Administration at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
22. GHAI, supra note 3, at 99.
23.
For an academic discussion focusing on China's transition from the absolute
power of Mao to the modem commercial era, see generally ANDREW NATHAN ET AL.,
CHINA'S TRANSITION (1998).
24. GHAI, supra note 3, at 99.
25.
Id.

minority should be subordinated to the majority; the lower level organ
should be subordinated to higher-level organ; 26and the local authority
should be subordinated to the central authority."
The concept for Hong Kong's legal system is closer to a separation of
powers model, a "horizontal" model, where decision-making power does
not funnel up, but is shared by equal branches. 27 The judiciary is independent
from the executive and from the legislature. How these two systems can
interact without China swallowing Hong Kong's autonomy is a ticklish
dilemma.
On December 18, 1984, China and Great Britain drafted the SinoBritish Joint Declaration. 28 It provided for British policies regarding
trade, currency, tax and expenditure, international relations, the role of
the executive, and the legal system. 29 It also provided for absolute
Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong, 30 along with China's twelve short
proposals for the special region.31 This binding treaty relieved Great
Britain of its responsibilities to Hong Kong and assured the world that
the people of Hong Kong would be protected. The reunification had
26. Id.
27. Weng, supra note 21 (explaining that the three branches in Hong Kong are the
executive branch, the legislative branch, and the judicial branch).
28. GHAI, supra note 3, at 56 (Joint Declaration of the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's
Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, signed in Beijing on December 19,
1984). See also http://www.tdctrade.com/jdeclaration/join.htm.

29.

GHAI,

supra note 3 at 51.

30. Id. at 47-48 (stating that England had originally proposed retaining
management and control over Hong Kong, but that Deng Xiaoping was not amenable to
this arrangement).
31. Id. at 49-50 (quoting ROBERT COTTRELL, THE END OF HONG KONG: THE
SECRET DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIAL RETREAT,

112 (1993). Hong Kong would "I) keep its

capitalist system; 2) remain a free port and a financial centre; 3) retain a convertible
currency; 4) not be run by emissaries from Beijing; 5) have a 'mayor' elected by local
inhabitants, who should be a 'patriot;' 6) run its own affairs without central government
interference, except in matters of defence and foreign affairs; 7) have 'considerable'
freedom to take part in international activities; 8) issue its own travel documents; 9) keep
its present legal system, so long as this did not conflict with Chinese sovereignty, and
have its own final court of appeal; 10) be responsible for its own law and order, to be
maintained by the police force; 11) tolerate political activities, even of the Nationalists,
so long as theses did not constituted sabotage; and 12) conduct its own 'social reforms'
without impositions from Beijing." Id. Deng Xiaoping's definition of "patriot" is as
follows: "The qualifications for a patriot are respect for the Chinese nation, sincere
support for the motherland's resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong and a desire not
to impair Hong Kong's prosperity and stability. Those who meet these requirements are
patriots, whether they believe in capitalism or feudalism or even slavery. We do not
demand that they be in favour of China's socialist system; we only ask them to love the
motherland and Hong Kong." GHAI, supra note 3, at 49 n.10 (quoting DENG XIAOPING,
ON THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG, II (The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation
of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin Under the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China trans., 1993)).
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Great Britain's blessing, and Hong Kong anxiously awaited its fate.
The handover was to occur July 1, 1997. The Basic Law Drafting
Committee (BLDC), comprised of both Chinese and Hong Kong
citizens, spent the next few years drafting the Basic Law, Hong Kong's
mini-constitution. 32 In many of the non-contentious areas, sections were
lifted verbatim from the Joint Declaration. 33 Issues that had not been
settled by the Joint Declaration, however, were hotly debated. For
instance, some Hong Kong members of the BLDC requested a
clarification of the relationship between the PRC Constitution and the
Basic Law. Martin Lee 34 suggested that the Basic Law should specify
which articles of the PRC Constitution applied to Hong Kong, but the
mainland members rejected this approach. They considered the Basic
Law subordinate to the PRC Constitution, and that only the National
which provisions of the
People's Congress (NPC) could specify
35
Constitution would apply to Hong Kong.
A second issue was the provision for interpretation of the Basic Law.
This issue was important because it would determine the status of the
Basic Law, the role of Hong Kong courts, the accommodation of the
Basic Law within the common law, and the relationship between the
Central Authorities and Hong Kong.36 The Joint Declaration provides
that the powers of adjudication would lie with Hong Kong courts, but
the Chinese conception of adjudication did not include interpretationwhich under the PRC Constitution was within the province of the

32. The Basic Law is the constitution of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region and part of the People's Republic of China Constitution. It spells out the
relationship between Hong Kong, China, and Hong Kong and rest of the world after
Hong Kong rejoined China in 1997. "[Tlhe Basic Law is generally referred to as a
'mini-constitution' (although the function of the prefix is unclear, except perhaps to
indicate that the HKSAR is subject to the PRC constitution)." GHAI, supra note 3, at
137.
33. GHAI, supra note 3, at 61 (explaining the provisions on the economy,
international trade, social organizations and the law were in many instances lifted
verbatim from the Joint Declaration).
34. Id. at 61-62. During 1994 through 2002, Martin C.M. Lee [hereinafter "Lee
Chu Ming"] served as Chairman of the Democratic Party, which was Hong Kong's
largest and most popular political party. Prior to the founding of the Democratic Party in
October 1994, Mr. Lee was Chairman of the United Democrats of Hong Kong (Hong
Kong's first political party), which won the first-ever democratic elections to the
territory's Legislative Council in 1991. See http://www.martinlee.org.hk/Biography.html.
35. Id. at 62 (quoting MARK ROBERTI, THE FALL OF HONG KONG: CHINA'S
TRIUMPH AND BRITAIN'S BETRAYAL, 165-66 (1994)).
36. Id.

Standing Committee.37 Martin Lee argued that the power of interpretation38
should be vested in the Hong Kong courts, not the Standing Committee.
This had been the arrangement in the original draft of the Basic Law.
Eventually, the drafting committee reached a compromise in which the
power to interpret provisions that concerned the autonomy of the
39 region
was to be delegated to Hong Kong by the Standing Committee.
The One Country, Two Systems concept is relevant to the power
struggle between the Standing Committee and the Hong Kong Court of
Final Appeal in the Right of Abode cases because it obviously evades
addressing the fundamental problem with the reunification. With two
systems, which system prevails when there is disagreement? The One
Country, Two Systems concept simply leaves the question unanswered.
Hong Kong wanted its autonomy and China wanted sovereignty over
Hong Kong. China agreed to give Hong Kong its autonomy, subject to
China's authority, and Hong Kong agreed to submit to China's authority,
subject to its autonomy. This fundamental paradox would be the basis
of the constitutional conflict between the Standing Committee and the
Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in the Right of Abode cases.4 °
A. The Basic Law: Constitution of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region
The Basic Law deviates significantly from the Joint Declaration in at
least three areas pertinent to this discussion of the conflict between the
Standing Committee and the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal. First,
the Hong Kong legislature (LegCo) is extremely weak, but the executive
is particularly dominant under the Basic Law.4 This raises the question
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. at 61-62.
For a thorough chronology of the establishment of the Hong Kong Special

Administrative Region, see Albert H.Y. Chen, The Basic Law: Legal Preparationfor the

Establishment of the Hong Kong SAR: Chronology and Selected Documents, 27 H.K.L.J.
405 (1997).
40. For a study on the status of the rule of law and human rights in Hong Kong
two years after the transition, see generally The Joseph R. Crowley Program, One
Country, Two Legal Systems?, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (1999)..
41. The Legislative Council, or "Legco" is popularly known as a "rubber stamp,"
implying that the legislature merely approves whatever the executive does. Emily Lau, a
46-year-old former journalist, is one of the strongest voices in Hong Kong in support of
elections. Lau, who garnered more votes in the 1995 legislative elections than any other
candidate, is harshly critical of the current legislative council. "All these people have
been turned into rubber stamps. They have decided in Peking, and so the legislature here,
the future government here, will just have to follow suit. It is crazy," she said. Rubber
stamp or not, it is the provisional legislature which will determine the future of
democracy in Hong Kong. Tom Mintier, Hong Kong's Voices of Democracy Worry
About Future, CNN World News, June, 26, 1997, available at http://www.cnn.com/
WORLD/9706/26/hong.kong.democracy/http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9706/26/hong.k
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whether there can be any real accountability for the executive branch 2
Only a small proportion of the legislature is directly elected through
universal franchise, and the electoral rules are biased in favor of proChina candidates.43 The Chief Executive is "elected" by the LegCo, and
is made accountable to the Chinese Government." In addition, the Chief
Executive, Tung Chee Hwa, was hand-picked by the Standing Committee.
Therefore, the absence of any accountability for the executive leaves
China in control of Hong Kong's legislative and executive branches of
government- When the Chief Executive of Hong Kong asked the Standing
Committee to reinterpret the Basic Law so as to overrule the Court in
1999, the executive and legislative branches of the Hong Kong government
teamed up with the Standing Committee to overrule the Court.
Second, although the Joint Declaration gives Hong Kong courts the
powers of final adjudication, under the Basic Law the ultimate powers of
interpretation of the Basic Law are vested in the Standing Committee. 4"
In the common law system, interpretation and adjudication usually go
together. Under the Basic Law, however, this bifurcation of interpretation
and adjudication is the fault line that eventually splits up families in the
Right of Abode cases.
If the power of interpretation and adjudication had been vested in the
Court under the Basic Law, the Standing Committee would not have
been able to legitimately nullify the Court's rulings awarding the Right
of Abode to all of the claimants. China would not have had the
opportunity to snuff out the power of the last independent branch of the
Hong Kong government-the judiciary.
Third, China had promised Hong Kong "a high degree of autonomy
except in foreign and defence affairs,"A In the Basic Law, however,
China promises only a high degree of autonomy without any specific
reservations. This may mean that all autonomy is qualified under the
Basic Law. 4
ong.democracy/lau.jpg.
42. GHAI, supra note 3, at 67 (stating that the Basic Law appears to give different
meanings to "elections" and "accountability of the executive to the legislature").
43. Id.
44. THE BASIC LAW art. 43.
45. GHAI, supra note 3, at 68 (summarizing the Basic Law articles 17, 158, 160).
46. Id. at 68 (quoting the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's
Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, done at Beijing on December 19,
1984.)
47.

id.

The vagueness of the provision gives China more power to interfere
with the autonomy of Hong Kong than was presumably intended by the
Hong Kong citizens who helped to draft the Basic Law. In situations
like the Right of Abode controversy where the Chinese government can
reference a legitimate national concern like mass immigration, the
Standing Committee might conceivably be able to directly interfere with
the laws and policies of Hong Kong by directly overruling the Court of
Final Appeal without resorting to reinterpretation of the Basic Law.
Plausibly, the Chinese government could control almost any issue
concerning Hong Kong by referencing pretextual national concerns.
Neither Great Britain nor the citizens of Hong Kong ever intended for
that to happen.
48
B. The Reunification of Hong Kong and China

July 1, 1997, the date of reunification, passed without violent uprising.49
China's first order of business was to abolish the legislature elected by
the people of Hong Kong in 1995, and replace it with the Provisional
LegCo composed of pro-China members appointed by Beijing. Many of
these appointed members had run but failed to win office in the 1995
free elections. LegCo "rubber stamped ' 50 several laws restricting freedom
of speech and assembly, rolled back the Bill of Rights, 51 and changed the
48. For a bibliography of books, monographs and articles relating to the
reunification of Hong Kong with China, see The Basic Law: A Bibliography of the Hong
Kong Transition,27 H.K.L.J. 247 1997.
49. The Tiananmen Square Massacre, fresh in the memories of the citizens of
Hong Kong, made the reunification a tense event. On June 4, 1989, the Chinese
government ordered the People's Liberation Army [hereinafter PLA] to violently
disperse nearly 2,600 men and women in Tiananmen Square who were protesting
corruption, inflation, and the arbitrary exercise of state power in China. The Chinese
government systematically arrested demonstration leaders, scholars, journalists, and
officials who had supported the democratic uprising. Many prisoners were sentenced to
death. The Chinese government denied that its troops had killed demonstrators, and
maintained that it was the demonstrators who had violently attacked the PLA, even in the
face of widespread television footage of the massacre. See 1989 Tiananmen Square
Massacre Remembered, DISPATCH ONLINE (Jun. 5, 1999), at http://www.dispatch.co.za/
1999/06/05/foreign/MASSACRE.htm; see generally ORVILLE SCHELL & ANDREW J.
NATHAN, CHILDREN OF THE DRAGON: THE STORY OF TIANANMEN SQUARE (1990)
(containing the testimony of student participants, foreign eyewitnesses, and excerpts
from the Chinese press).
50. Mintier, supra note 41.
51. The Bill of Rights Ordinance NO. 59 OF 1991 [hereinafter BORO], available
This was drafted shortly after the
at http://www.hknet.com/Inform/billor.html.
Tiananmen Square Massacre, and was intended to protect the civil liberties of Hong
Kong citizens after the reunification. "It embodies the provisions of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter ICCPR] as applied to Hong Kong.
Article 39 of the Basic Law further provides that the rights and freedoms enjoyed by
Hong Kong residents shall not be restricted unless as prescribed by law, and that such
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electoral rules to favor pro-China candidates. In May 1998, free elections
for the Legislative Council were held under the new electoral rules.
Although voter turnout was fifty percent higher than any previous
election in Hong Kong and the democrats won two-thirds of the votes,
they obtained only one-third of the legislative positions

2

The Chinese government appointed Tung Chee Hwa as Chief Executive
of Hong Kong in 1997. Although many of Hong Kong's citizens approved
of him, he had strong ties to Beijing, and was accountable to the

Standing Committee.

3

The only branch of Hong Kong's new government that appeared to
have any meaningful degree of independence from Beijing was the
judiciary. The Court of Final Appeal (the Court) is Hong Kong's highest
appellate court. A non-partisan commission made the judicial appointments,

and the quality of judges is high. The Court is headed by Chief Justice
Andrew Li, and consists of three other permanent judges: Justice
Bokhary, Justice Chan, and Justice Ribeiro.

Twelve non-permanent

Hong Kong judges 54 and nine non-permanent judges from other common
law jurisdictions also sit on the Court when invited to do so. 5

The Basic

restriction shall not contravene the provisions in the ICCPR and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [hereinafter ICESCR]." Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government, Hong Kong Bill of Rights
availableat http.www.info.gov.hk/info/billrght.htm (last updated Oct. 2003).
52. Vote for Democracy, (PBS The News Hour with Jim Lehrer radio broadcast,
May 25, 1998), available at http.www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june98/hongkong
_5-25.html.
53. The Standing Committee is the center of power in the Chinese government and
all members of the Standing Committee are members of the Communist Party. Many
believe Tung Chee Hwa, a shipping tycoon, is beholden to the Chinese government
because in 1986, he obtained a $120 million bailout loan from the Chinese government,
restructured the company and turned it into a $1.7 billion corporation.. See Newsmaker
Profiles: Tung Chee-hwa, CNN, 1998, at http://www.cnn.com/resources/newsmakers/
world/asia/chee.hwa.html (on file with author.).
54. There are eight non-permanent Hong Kong judges: Sir Derek Cons, Mr.
William James Silke, Mr. Kutlu Tekin Faud, Mr. Philip Gerard Clough, Sir Noel
Plunkett Power, GBS, Mr. Gerald Paul Nazareth, GBS, Mr. John Barry Mortimer, GBS,
and Mr. Henry Denis Litton, GBM. HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
(HKSAR) GOVERNMENT, Judiciary: Guide to Court Services: FinalAppeal Judges List,

at http://www.info.gov.hk/jud/guide2cs/html/cfaljudgelst.htm (last modified Sept. 4,
2003).
55. There are ten non-permanent judges from other common law jurisdictions:
Hon Sir Anthony Mason, AC, KBE, Rt Hon the Lord Cooke of Thorndon, KBE, Rt Hon
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Rt Hon the Lord Hoffmann, Hon Sir Gerard Brennan, AC,
KBE, Rt Hon Sir Thomas Eichelbaum, Rt Hon the Lord Millett, Rt Hon the Lord Woolf
of Barnes, Rt Hon the Lord of Scott of Foscote, and Rt Hon Sir Ivor Richardson. HONG
KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION (HKSAR) GOVERNMENT, supra note 54.

Law states that the Court's decisions are final and unappealable. With
such a highly qualified and independent judiciary, it appeared that the
rights of Hong Kong's citizens would be protected in the Court.
III. THE RIGHT OF ABODE CASES: CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS OVER
JUDICIAL REVIEW

The Basic Law Article 24(2)(3) confers the status of permanent resident
on and affords Right of Abode in Hong Kong to citizens born in Hong
Kong, citizens who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous
period of seven years, and persons of Chinese nationality born outside
Hong Kong of those residents listed in the first two categories.56 Article
22(4), however, requires people coming from other parts of China to
apply for approval in order to enter Hong Kong. Additionally, those
who enter Hong Kong with the intent of settling there are subject to a
quota determined by the competent authorities of the Central People's
Government after consulting with the government of the region.57
This provision in Article 22(4) raised two legal questions: (1) whether
the Right of Abode provided for in Article 24(2) is conditioned on
Article 22(4); and (2) whether the Court is obliged to refer this matter
for interpretation to the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress in accordance with Article 158(3).58
56. THE BASIC LAW, art. 24(2)(1)-(3) ("The permanent residents of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region shall be: (1) Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong
before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; (2)
Chinese citizens who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of
not less than seven years before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region; (3) Persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of
those residents listed in categories (1) and (2).").
57. THE BASic LAW, art. 22(4) ("For entry into the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, people form other parts of China must apply for approval.
Among them, the number of persons who enter the Region for the purpose of settlement
shall be determined by the competent authorities of the Central People's Government
after consulting the government of the Region.").
58. THE BASIC LAW, art. 158(l)-(3) states:
(1) The power of interpretation of this Law (Basic Law) shall be vested in the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. (2) The Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress shall authorize the courts of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to interpret on their own, in
adjudicating cases, the provisions of this Law which are within the limits of the
autonomy of the Region (3) The courts of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region may also interpret other provisions of this Law in
adjudicating cases. However, if the courts of the Region, in adjudicating cases,
need to interpret the provisions of this Law concerning affairs which are the
responsibility of the Central People's Government, or concerning the
relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region, and if such
interpretation will affect the judgments on the cases, the courts of the Region
shall, before making their final judgments which are not appealable, seek an
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If the Right of Abode issue were within the "autonomy" of Hong Kong,
no referral would be necessary. However, if the issue concerned "affairs
which are the responsibility of the Central People's Government," or
"the relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region," and
the interpretation would affect the judgments in the cases, the Court was
obliged to seek an official interpretation by the Standing Committee
before issuing an unappealable judgment.5 9
The Hong Kong government, concerned about the number of potential
Right of Abode claimants,60 tried to resolve these legal issues legislatively
by passing two immigration amendments to limit the number of
claimants.
Immigration Amendment 2 provided that persons eligible
under Article 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law were limited to those born after
at least one of their parents had become a Hong Kong permanent
resident.62 Children born on the mainland before their Hong Kong
parents had ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for seven years were not
eligible for permanent residence or right of abode in Hong Kong under
Article 24(2)(3). Immigration Amendment 3 required verification of
63
permanent resident status under the Basic Law, and operated retroactively.
Both immigration amendments violated the Basic Law Articles
24(2)(3), and in early July 1997 a number of claimants initiated judicial
review proceedings to challenge the amendments. The number of
claimants quickly increased, and there was growing concern about the
cost of litigation. Because almost all of the claims involved the same
issue (the interpretation and scope of Article 24(2)(3) and its relationship
interpretation of the relevant provisions from the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress through the Court of Final Appeal of the Region.

When the Standing Committee makes an interpretation of the provisions
concerned, the courts of the Region, in applying those provisions, shall follow
the interpretation of the Standing Committee. However, judgments previously
rendered shall not be affected.

59.

Id.

60.

"The Hong Kong government has estimated that 1.67 million Chinese may

hold a valid claim to the Right of Abode under the Basic Law." Press Release, Hong
Kong Policy Research Institute, Ltd., The Public Opposes to Bear Burden of Influx of
Residents from the Mainland, Apr. 30, 1999, available at http://www.hkpri.org.hk/press/

hc990430/hc990430e.html.

"Many have criticized the figure as nothing more than

propaganda and scare tactics." Gren Manuel, Survey tofind Mainlanders Impact Halted,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 25, 1999, available at http://www.special.scmp.com

rightofabode/background/ZZZLS3DSNJC.html.
61. The Provisional Legislative Council passed two immigration amendments to
the Hong Kong Immigration Ordinance.
62.
63.

IMMIGRATION AMENDMENT No. 2 (July 1, 1997).
IMMIGRATION AMENDMENT No. 3 (July 10, 1997).

to Article 22(4)), 64 several cases were chosen as "test cases" or
"representative cases." There was no court order dictating that the applicants
were actual representatives for parties not joined in the proceedings, nor
was there evidence that any of the parties actually agreed to be bound by
the representative cases. But senior government officials announced that
the Hong Kong government would abide by the decisions of the courts.
The Legal Aid Department even wrote letters to individual applicants for
legal aid stating that there was no need for them to commence
proceedings because the Court of Final Appeal was resolving their issue.
On January 29, 1999, in Ng Ka Ling, the Court held that Article
24(3) was not qualified by Article 22(4), so claimants did not need oneway exit permits issued by the mainland to exercise their Right of Abode
as permanent citizens. Thus, that section of the Immigration Amendment 3
was held unconstitutional because it was inconsistent with Article
24(2)(3) of the Basic Law. The retroactive provision was also held to be
unconstitutional .66

The Court also declared that Hong Kong courts could invalidate acts
of the NPC (in this case LegCo) if such acts breached the Basic Law.
The Court also reiterated that interpretation of the Basic Law is to be
carried out by the Court of Final Appeal, not the Standing Committee, if
the main issue in the case concerns Hong Kong's autonomy.67
Significantly, the Court decided that it, rather than the NPC, would
decide whether a case should be referred to the NPC under Article 158.68
That same day, in Chan Kam Nga, 69 the Court also held that Article
24(2)(3) applied to Chinese nationals born outside Hong Kong of Hong
Kong permanent residents, regardless of whether they were born before
or after at least one of their parents had acquired the status of permanent
resident. Thus, the conflicting section of Immigration Amendment 2
was also held unconstitutional.
The decisions hit like a bombshell. The Court had unequivocally
declared its power of judicial review over even the NPC. 7' It was a
64.
returning
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

The Basic Law Art. 22(4) requires claimants to get China's permission before
to Hong Kong.
Ng Ka Ling v. Dir. of Immigr. (I), [1999] 1 H.K. Legal Rep. & Dig. 315.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 342.
Id.
Chan Kam Nga & Others v. Dir. of Immigr. [1999] 1 H. K. Legal Rep. & Dig.

304.

70.
71.

Id. at313.
For additional discussion of the Chan Kam Nga and Ng Ka Ling cases, see

Albert H Y Chen, The Interpretationof the Basic Law-Common Law and Mainland

Chinese Perspectives, 30 H.K.L.J. 380 (2000) (examining the history of constitutional
interpretation in common law world, especially in the United States and suggesting Hong
Kong's journey in constitutional interpretation has only just begun); see also Maria
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haughty move considering China's tremendous pride and power. The
Court had determined that its interpretation of the Basic Law was
superior to that of the NPC. It was unlikely that China would simply
accept the Court's view. The Hong Kong government had expected the
Court to follow the immigration amendments and was caught off guard
when it declared them unconstitutional. Government officials made
public announcements that Hong Kong would abide by the decisions of
the Court, though the rulings would place a heavy burden on Hong
Kong's social services, such as housing and medical care. The Hong
Kong Bar Association, leading lawyers, and constitutional law scholars
72
called the judgments a victory for the rule of law in Hong Kong.

Those claimants affected by the judgments came out of hiding and asked
the government for permission to stay.
On February 5, 1999, Beijing expressed its opinion of the Court
rulings, first through four prominent mainland legal scholars, Xiao
Weiyun, Shao Tianren, Wu Jianfan, and Xu Congde. They stated that
the Court had no legal basis for declaring its power of judicial review
over the NPC and its Standing Committee. The implication was that

Loventime U. Estanislao, Right Of Final Adjudication In Hong Kong: Establishing
Procedures Of Constitutional Interpretation, I ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 10 (2000)
(describing China and Hong Kong's conflicting constitutions); see also Todd Schneider,
David v. Goliath?: The Hong Kong Courts and China's National People's Congress
Standing Committee, 20 BERKELEY J.INT'L L. 575 (2002) (questioning the view that the
Standing Committee will always be triumphant in showdowns with the Court); see also
Karmen Kam, Right Of Abode Cases: The Judicial Independence Of The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region v. The Sovereignty Interests Of China, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 611 (2002) (discussing the fundamental difference between the common law system
in Hong Kong and China's legal system as the rule of law versus a rule by law). For
example, Kam states that "[t]he common law court generally defers the social
consequences of its decision to the administration, focusing mainly on the interpretation
of the law. On the other hand, the Chinese legal system takes into consideration such
issues as the consequences of every decision and action." Id. at 632.
72. Weng, supra note 21; see also Press Release, Hong Kong Bar Association,
CFA Judgment on the Right of Abode of Hong Kong Residents (Feb. 5, 1999), available
at http://martinlee.org.hk/TheBar'sViews.html.
73. "The legal experts in question were Professors Xiao Weiyun and Shao Tianren
of Peking University, Professor Wu Jianfan of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
and Professor Xu Congde of People's University. They are all distinguished legal
scholars who had taken part in the drafting of the Basic Law, Hong Kong's mini
constitution, promulgated by the NPC in 1990."
Frank Ching, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Hong Kong Update, The
Court of Final Appeal Row. Feb.-Mar. 1999, available at http://www.csis.org/asia/
hkupdate/hk 15fc.html

"one country" would triumph over "two systems. 74 China would reclaim
the ultimate authority over interpretations of the Basic Law.
Public opinion was strongly adverse to the rulings. There was
widespread fear of mass immigration of mainlanders into Hong Kong.
In a survey conducted by the Institute for Hong Kong Policy Research
on February 8, 1999, the index measuring citizen confidence in Hong
Kong's relationship with the Central People's Government plummeted
by nearly 45% in one week. 75 Another survey conducted by the same
group just after the Hong Kong government announced that under the
Court's January rulings, 1.67 million mainlanders would have the right
to live in Hong Kong. 6 The second survey revealed that given a choice,
83.8% of respondents preferred to amend the Basic Law or ask Beijing
for help. Only 16.2% said they would insist on maintaining the ruling of
the Court and be willing to bear the population burden."
On February 24, 2002, the Secretary of Justice for Hong Kong
formally requested that the Court clarify the part of its ruling that
asserted a power of judicial review over legislative acts of the NPC and
the NPC Standing Committee. The legal community was shocked and
outraged at this unprecedented and insulting request. Some thought that
the Court's judicial independence was being questioned for purely
political reasons. Many strongly urged the court to reject the government's
request. 78 Yash Ghai said the request was a "gross humiliation. 79
Martin Lee commented that it was not necessary for the "court to explain
its own clear judgment just because someone in Beijing does 80not
understand it. Today is a sad day for the rule of law in Hong Kong."
The Court had clearly ruled in favor of the Right of Abode claimants
against popular opinion and government pressure, but in conformity with
the Basic Law. This isolation would make it difficult for the Court to
maintain its position in the months ahead. The Court had championed
74. Chris Yeung, Litmus Test of Deng's Concept, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb.
13, 1999, available at http://www.special.scmp.com/npclI999/Index.aspl 14.html.
75. Weng, supra note 21 (stating 723 people were interviewed for the survey on
Apr. 30, 1999).
76. Manuel, supra note 60 ("A survey that could verify the number of mainlanders
that could come to the SAR has been aborted, triggering allegations that officials were
afraid it would contradict their previous estimate of 1.6 million .... The government
conducted a survey earlier this year that estimated 1.6 million mainlanders would be
eligible to live in Hong Kong under the Court of Final Appeal's January 29 ruling. That
figure has been heavily criticised because it includes the assumption that there are a
million or so illegitimate children with a Hong Kong parent, a figure seen as by some
groups as vastly inflated.").
77. Press Release, Hong Kong Research Institute (Apr. 30, 1999), available at
http://www.hkpri.org.hk/press/hc990430/hc990430e.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2003).
78. Weng, supra note 21.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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the clear constitutional rights of the minority, and in doing so had
directly opposed the Hong Kong government's desire to deport the Right
of Abode claimants. The government's request for clarification was a
thinly disguised challenge of the Court's authority to make such a
decision. Hong Kong government officials hoped for a retraction or
limitation of the Court's self-proclaimed power of judicial review. In
addition, it was fairly obvious that the challenge was coming directly
from China in response to the Court's bold assertion of judicial review
over the acts of the NPC and NPC Standing Committee. The Standing
Committee was drawing a line in the sand.
On February 26, 2002, all five justices cooperated with the request by
issuing a short statement of clarification. It explained that:
the court's judicial power is derived from the Basic Law. . . . The courts'
jurisdiction to interpret the Basic Law in adjudicating cases is derived by
authorization from the Standing Committee under arts. 158(2) and 158(3)....
The Court's judgment on January 29, 1999, did not question the authority of the
Standing Committee to make an interpretation under art. 158 which would have
courts of the Region. The court accepts that it cannot
to be followed by the 81
question that authority.

The last sentence of the Court's statement reads, "Nor did the court's
judgment question, and the court accepts that it cannot question, the
authority of the NPC or the Standing Committee to do any act which is
in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law and the procedure
therein. 82 The tone was deferential, but the statement still seemed to
imply that the Court retained the power to question any acts of the NPC
or Standing Committee that might not be in accordance with the
provisions of the Basic Law. Legal scholars in Hong Kong grumbled
that politics had compromised the independence of the court.
The reaction on the mainland was fairly positive. Two of the legal
experts who had attacked the Court's January rulings said they were
satisfied.84 Xiao Weiyun said that the statement had clarified the
81. Ng Ka Ling & Others v. Dir. of Immigr. (II), [1999] 1 H. K. Legal Rep. & Dig.
577, 578.
82. Id. at 578.
83.

For a contrary viewpoint, see Tom Clarke, Ng Kaling v. Dir.of lmmigr.; Tsui

Kuen Nang v. Dir. Of Immigr.; Dir. Of Immigr v. Cheung Lai Wah, 23 MELBOURNE U.
L.R. 773 (1999)(suggesting the rule of law in Hong Kong did not die with the Chan and
Nga cases, but rather, that the Court's surrender to the Standing Committee's
reinterpretation was politically savvy).
84. "Two mainland legal experts, also former Basic Law drafters, who had
attacked the ruling said they were satisfied with the clarification. Xiao Weiyun said the

relationship between the court and the NPC and that the clarification was
necessary. 85 Wu Jianfan said that the court's statement had helped to
resolve the matter, 86but that this did not mean that the row could be
settled immediately.
Shortly thereafter, another bombshell hit Hong Kong. The State Council
took the unprecedented step of asking the Standing Committee to
interpret Articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3) according to their "true legislative
intent. 87 The State Council made this request in response to Chief
Executive Tung Chee 88Hwa's special report to the Council concerning the
Right of Abode issue.
This was a highly controversial move because it further challenged the
already bruised authority of the Court, and also because Article 158 of
the Basic Law did not seem to allow Hong Kong's executive branch to
appeal straight to the Standing Committee. 89 It also appeared to be an
statement on Friday had clarified the relationship between the court and the NPC and
that the clarification was necessary. "The NPC enjoys the highest authority, which could
not be denied by other organisations," Mr Xiao said. Wu Jianfan said the court statement
had given a clear explanation but said this did not imply the row could be settled
immediately. This is related to many questions including the 'one country, two systems'
concept, which is a complicated issue." May Sin-mi Hon, Qian adds to easing of abode
dispute, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 1, 1999, available at http://special.scmp.com/
npcl999/Index.aspl 12.html.
85. May Sin-mi Hon, supra note 84.
86. Id.
87. "The Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress examined
at its Tenth session the "Motion Regarding the Request for an Interpretation of Articles
22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
the People's Republic of China" submitted by the State Council. The motion of the State
Council was submitted upon the report furnished by the Chief Executive of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region under the relevant provisions of Articles 43 and
48(2) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China. The issue raised in the Motion concerns the interpretation of the
relevant provisions of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
of the People's Republic of China by the Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region in its judgment dated 29 January 1999."
The
Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of Articles
22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
the People's Republic of China, Appendix to THE BASIC LAW, available at
http://www.info.gov.hk/basiclaw/fulltext/content0221 .htm.
88. Tung Chee Hwa, The Chief Executive's Report to the State Council concerning
the right of abode issue for an interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Basic Law,
available at http://www.octs.org.hk/e-cedoc.htm.
Hong Kong respects the judgments of Hong Kong's courts. We have
considered carefully and repeatedly the available options for resolving this
issue. As the issue is one of principle involving how the Basic Law should be
interpreted, and as the control of entry of Mainland residents into Hong Kong
has a bearing on the relationship between the Central Authorities and Hong
Kong, Hong Kong is no longer capable of resolving the problem on its own.
Id.
89. See THE BASIC LAW, art. 158 (requiring the judiciary to seek an interpretation
by the Standing Committee in cases where a judgment will affect the relationship
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obvious attempt by the executive to displace the rulings of the Court.
Hong Kong Bar Association Chairman Ronny Tong Ka-Wah commented:
"You are not saying the meaning is unclear. You are saying the effect of
that meaning is not acceptable. You have to amend.. . otherwise, the
Basic Law is not worth the paper it's written on."' 90
On June 26, 1999, the Standing Committee used its power under
Article 158(1) to interpret Articles 22(4), and 24(2)(3) in a way which
directly contradicted the Court's interpretation of the same provisions.
According to the Standing Committee, Article 22(4) qualifies Article
24(2)(3) so that persons falling within Article 24(2)(3) must apply for
approval from the mainland authorities to enter Hong Kong. Also, to
qualify under Article 24(2)(3), at least one of the claimant's parents must
already be a Hong Kong permanent resident at the time of the claimant's
birth.
Thus, citizens born in Hong Kong, citizens who had ordinarily resided
in Hong Kong for a continuous period of seven years, and persons of
Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of residents listed in the
first two categories had to apply for approval from the mainland
authorities to enter Hong Kong. Under the Court's interpretation, no
approval was necessary, and citizens who fell in these categories
automatically had an enforceable Right of Abode in Hong Kong.
In addition, to qualify for the Right of Abode as the child of a Hong
Kong resident under the Standing Committee reinterpretation, at least
one of the claimant's parents must have already been a Hong Kong
resident at the time of the claimant's birth. This was meant to prevent a
possibly burdensome influx of children born to immigrants before they
acquired their Right of Abode. The Standing Committee had reinstated
the two immigration amendments and directly overturned the Court's
"final" rulings. 9'
The Standing Committee was careful to add, however, that the two
between the mainland and the Special Administrative Region, but there is no provision
for the executive to do so if the judiciary has decided it is not necessary.)
90. Cliff Buddle, Basic Law worthless if reinterpreted, Bar chief warns, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, May 11, 1999, availableat http://www.special.scmp.com/rightofabode/
background/ZZZP158SNJC.html.

91. The Standing Committee did not overrule the Court's decision that the
retroactive provision of Amendment 2 was unconstitutional, however. The Interpretation
by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of Articles 22(4) and
24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China, available at http://www.info.gov.hk/basiclaw/fulltext
/content0221.htm.

cases decided in January by the Court were not overruled; the parties to
those proceedings could stay. But the reinterpretation prevented the
Court's holdings from applying to other similarly situated Right of
Abode claimants.92 The Standing Committee managed to stay within the
letter of the law by not expressly overruling the Court, but of course the
effect of the reinterpretation
was to destroy the precedential value of the
93
Chan and Nga rulings.
Right of Abode claimants who had come out of hiding after the
Court's Chan and Nga rulings were stunned. Virtually everyone had
thought the Court's rulings would be the final say on the matter. The
Basic Law did not state that the Hong Kong executive could overrule the
Court by appealing to the Standing Committee, yet that is exactly what
happened. It was a constitutional crisis and human rights tragedy.
Foreign investors watched the developing legal controversy with unease.
Thousands of claimants appealed to the Hong Kong government for
leniency.
In December 1999, the Court decided the third case, Lau Kong Yung
& Others v. Directorof Immigration.94 The Court held that the Standing
Committee's reinterpretation of the Basic Law was a valid and binding
interpretation of Articles 22(4), 24(2)(3), and that the courts of Hong
Kong were under a duty to follow this interpretation in the future. 95 On
the same day, the Hong Kong government announced a "concession." It
allowed "persons who arrived in Hong Kong between 1 July 199796 and
92. The Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress of Articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China was adopted by the Standing
Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress at its Tenth Session on 26 June 1999
Id. (demonstrating that the Standing Committee did not overrule the Court directly, but
nullified the precedential effect of the Chan Kam Nga and Ng Ka Ling cases).
93. The effect of the Standing Committee's reinterpretation on the international
business community was significant. Investors worried that the rule of law was
beginning to break down in Hong Kong, and that they would no longer be able to rely on
the Hong Kong legal system to enforce business agreements in China. See James
Conachy, Legal Dispute between Hong Kong and Beijing worries investors, availableat
http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/apr1999/hk-a02.shtml (Apr. 2, 1999). Without Hong
Kong, foreign investors would have to rely on Chinese courts to enforce agreements, and
China's legal record was not favorable. See Anthony Francis Neoh, Legal Relations
between Hong Kong and China, HKDF Newsletter, Issue 14, Mar. 2000, available at
http://www.hkdf.org/newsletters/0003/0003_4.htm.
94. Lau Kong Yung & Others v. Dir. of Immigr., [1999] 3 H.K. Legal Rep. & Dig.
778.
95. Id. at 780.
96. July 1, 1997, is the date of Hong Kong's reunification, which is also the date
the Basic Law came into effect ("[Tihe Government of the People's Republic of China
will resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997,
thus fulfilling the long-cherished common aspiration of the Chinese people for the
recovery of Hong Kong."). GHAI, supra note 3, at 532.
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29 January 1999, 97 and had claimed the Right of Abode, to have their
status as permanent residents verified in accordance with the two
judgments."98
A. Martin Lee Denounces China's "Post Remedial Mechanism"
The legal community denounced these developments in the "One
Country, Two Systems" concept. Hong Kong's autonomy was quickly
slipping away. Martin Lee observed that there were better solutions to
the possible social and economic problems associated with a potential
mass immigration by Right of Abode claimants into Hong Kongsolutions that would not destroy the rule of law in Hong Kong. 99
An amendment to Article 24 of the Basic Law, which could have been
pursued under Article 159 of the Basic Law, could have reduced the
burden on Hong Kong without compromising its autonomy. The
amendment could have taken a similar form to an article in Macau's
Basic Law, and could have "denied the Right of Abode to children born
outside of Hong Kong before their parents have obtained permanent
resident status."' According to Lee, the reinterpretation, which displaced
the Court rulings with language similar to Lee's proposed amendment,
additionally undermined confidence in the finality of Hong Kong's ' 'legal
system. It had also given Beijing a "post verdict remedial mechanism. 0
Lee recounts how Beijing pressed the Sino-British Joint Liaison
Group for a "post verdict remedial mechanism" in the final years of
Britain's rule of Hong Kong. The British refused, however, because
such a mechanism would subject Hong Kong's legal system to the
97. January 29, 1999 is the date the Court decided the Chan Kam Nga and Ng Ka
Ling cases in favor of the Right of Abode claimants. Chan Kam Nga v. Dir. of Immigr.,
[1999] 1 H. K. Legal Rep. & Dig. 304; Ng Ka Ling v. Dir. of Immigr. (I), [1999] 1 H.K.
Legal Rep. & Dig. 315.
98. Press Release, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, June
26, 1999. "[T]o comply with the principle that judgments previously rendered by the
Court of Final Appeal shall not be affected by an interpretation of the National People's
Congress Standing Committee, we will allow persons who arrived in Hong Kong
between July 1, 1997 and January 29, 1999, and had claimed the right of abode, to have
their status as permanent residents verified in accordance with the CFA decision. It is
estimated that there are about 3,700 people in this category." Transcript of media session
on NPCSC interpretation of Basic Law (Concession) available at http://www.info.
gov.hk/eindex.htm (in June 1999 archives).
99. Martin Lee Chu-ming, Time to Assess Deng's Legacy, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Feb. 22, 2000.
100. Id.
101. Id.

political whims of China. Lee argues that this is evidence that Beijing
knew at that time that the Basic Law did not confer the power to
overrule the Court. "Why else ask for such power?"'' 0 2 Lee adds that
because no such mechanism was agreed on, all were entitled to expect
that the Court's decision on the Right of Abode cases would be the final
word. Reliance was reasonable.
Furthermore, implementing constitutional decisions with which the
government disagrees is not an uncommon governmental duty. It is a
duty born of respect for "institutional integrity and autonomy." If the
government vehemently disagrees with a constitutional
ruling of its
03
highest court, the proper remedy is an amendment. 1
Lee's analysis of the legislative history of the Basic Law has several
implications for the Right of Abode cases. Most importantly, it
demonstrates the basis for the claimant's faith in the finality of the
Court's judgments in the Chan and Nga cases, and the root of their
legitimate expectation claim in the Ng Siu Tung case. The Right of
Abode claimants had every reason to believe that the Court of Final
Appeal had the final say in the matter, and in many cases their reliance
on that belief was ultimately their undoing.
IV. NG Siu TUNG & OTHERS V. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION:
JANUARY 10, 2002

The latest case decided concerning the Right of Abode controversy in
Hong Kong is Ng Siu Tung. 104 It is particularly significant because the
applicants appealed on the grounds that the Standing Committee's
reinterpretation did not apply to them. This strategy provided the Court
with a choice of loopholes. If the Court allowed the applicants to get
around the reinterpretation, the Hong Kong judiciary would once again
reclaim some of its independence from Beijing and its own executive
branch. Doing so, however, would directly conflict with the Standing
Committee's clear intent to limit immigration from China to Hong Kong
through its reinterpretation of the Right of Abode provision in the Basic
Law. The Court's majority decided to remain consistent with the
reinterpretation, and denied most of the applicants in every significant
way. 105

102. Id.
103. Id. Martin Lee advocating separation of powers, a position with which PRC
clearly disagrees.
104. Ng Siu Tung & Others v. Dir. of Immigr., [2002] 1 H. K. Legal Rep. & Dig.
561, at 561-62.
105. Presiding Judges in the case were Li CJ, Bokhary, Chan and Ribeiro PJJ, and
Sir Anthony Mason NPJ. Id. at 561.
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Justice Bokhary strongly dissented, asserting that under the Doctrine
of Legitimate Expectation, the applicants deserved to stay. Bokhary
argued that the Hong Kong government's assurances to the applicants
that they would not be deported induced the applicants to reasonably
rely on these statements to their detriment. The applicants' reliance
caused them to refrain from taking the very procedural steps that would
have saved them.10 6 Consequently, they had to return to the mainland,
while other members of their families stayed in Hong Kong. This
occurred despite the Basic Law provision, which clearly guaranteed their
Right of Abode, and despite the unambiguous initial rulings of the Court
affirming that constitutional right.
Had the Court majority gone along with Bokhary, it would have had
Instead, it chose to conform to
ample support in English precedent.
Law. Perhaps the Court
of
the
Basic
the Chinese reinterpretation
thought that it would retain more power if it did not draw further
criticism and censure from Beijing, but it seems unlikely that Beijing
will refrain from overruling the Court in the future because the Court
backed down. Perhaps the Court believed it lost the battle when the
people of Hong Kong did not fight for an independent judiciary, but
instead supported the idea of a reinterpretation of their constitution by
the Standing Committee.
A. The Issues
In Ng Siu Tung, the applicants presented five issues, asserting that the
reinterpretation did not apply to them:
(1)

Article 158(3) of the Basic Law guarantees that "judgments
previously rendered shall not be affected" by reinterpretations
of the Basic Law by the Standing Committee, therefore, the
judgments in the Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga case
should not be affected by the reinterpretation, and the rights
of other applicants similarly situated should not be affected
(judgments previously rendered issue);

106. See id. at 657-64.
107. Because Hong Kong retained its common law tradition, English precedent still
has persuasive authority in Hong Kong courts ("The laws previously in force in Hong
Kong, that is, the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and
customary law shall be maintained, except for any that contravene this Law, and subject
to any amendment by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.")
THE BAsic LAW, supra note 19, at art. 8.

(2)

Even if they were affected, the similarly situated applicants
had a legitimate expectation from public assurances by the
government of Hong Kong that their cases would be treated
in the same way as the "test cases" (legitimate expectation
issue);
(3) Because of the grave injustice that would be suffered by the
applicants, it would be an abuse of process for the Director
of Immigration to force them to leave by executing the
removal orders against them (abuse of process issue);
(4) Those applicants who arrived in Hong Kong before July 1,
1997, were not subject to article 22 of the Basic Law and
the interpretation, and those who arrived between July 1
and July 10, 1997, were not affected by the reinterpretation
or the No. 3 Ordinance, which were held by the Court and
the Standing Committee not to apply retrospectively
(periods-one-and-two issue);
(5) Those applicants who arrived before January 29, 1999. had
a legitimate expectation that they would be treated as if they
were parties to the test cases, provided they could satisfy the
conditions of the Concession. The Director of Immigration
had misinterpreted the policy, thereby frustrating these
expectations (Concession issue).
The majority decided the last three issues without dissent from Justice
Bokhary. The court held that the abuse of process claim failed because
the acts that were said to give rise to the claim were not part of the curial
10 8
process, and thus could not amount to an abuse of power by the court.
Regarding the periods-one-and-two issue, the court held in favor of the
applicants in period one (those who had entered Hong Kong before July
1, 1997, were not subject to Article 22(4) and did not need a one-way
exit permit so long as they satisfied the time-of-birth requirement), 10 9 but
against those in period two (the exit-permit requirement applied to those
who entered Hong Kong without Mainland approval between July 1 and
July 10, 1997)." With regard to the Concession issue, the court held
that the Director of Immigration did not misinterpret the policy decision
when he required applicants to meet additional criteria."'
108. Ng Siu Tung & Others v. Dir. of Immigr., [2002] 1 H.K. Legal Rep. & Dig. at
617-19.
109. Id. at 619-21 (explaining that these applicants had arrived in Hong Kong
before it reverted to China, their entry was not covered by the Basic Law, which came
into effect July 1, 1997). Thirty-two applicants fell into this category. Id. at 621.
110. Id. at 621 (reasoning that the applicants could not take the benefit of Article
24(2)(3) without at the same time accepting the restriction in Article 22(4)).
111. Id. at 628, 648-49. The Director of Immigration's additional criteria was "(1)
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The majority's decisions on the judgments-previously-rendered issue
and the legitimate-expectation issue drew heavy criticism from Justice
Bokhary. Although some applicants' Right of Abode claims were
confirmed under these arguments, many were denied.' 1 2 Bokhary would
have granted the Right of Abode to all of the applicants under either
theory. Had the majority gone Bokhary's way, the court would have
legitimately sidestepped the Standing Committee's reinterpretation of
the Basic Law.
B. The Judgments Previously Rendered Issue

The applicants cited Article 158(3) of the Basic Law, "judgments
previously rendered shall not be affected" in support of the notion that
the applicants have an accrued right under the judgments in Ng Ka Ling
and Chan Kam Nga that should not be affected by the reinterpretation.
The applicants argued that the word "judgments" means the "ratio
decidendi," or holding, including "rights declared," and that "judgments"
should be widely interpreted to include their accrued rights due to the
circumstances and those existing in Ng Ka Ling
similarity between their
113
and Chan Kam Nga.
The Director of Immigration took issue with the broad interpretation
of "judgments," and asserted that the common law meaning (orders,

declarations by the court) was more appropriate. The court sided with
the Director on this issue:

the person must have been present in Hong Kong during the period from 1 July 1997 to
29 January 1999; (2) during that period, he had made a claim to the Immigration
Department for the Right of Abode; (3) he was physically in Hong Kong when the claim
was made; and (4) the Director of Immigration has a record of such a claim." Id. at 628.
Interpreting the Director's criteria, the court specified that "any document which: (i)
clearly identified a person as a Hong Kong permanent resident and another person as his
child; (ii) provided some details such as his or her date or place of birth; and (iii) asked
for the child to come to Hong Kong either to settle or to enjoy his or her Right of Abode,
should be reasonably understood as making a claim to the Right of Abode. A rejection
of a document which satisfied these criteria would amount to a misapplication of the
policy decision." Id. at 567; see also id. at 636-37.
112. The court quashed the removal orders of over 1,000 applicants under the
Legitimate Expectation Issue. Id. at 616. Thirty-two applicants' removal orders were
quashed under the "Periods I and 2" Issue. Id. at 621. The Director of Immigration still
has discretion to remove these people from Hong Kong, but he must reconsider their
cases in light of the court's ruling. Id. at 611. The total number of applicants who
applied to the court for relief is 5,073. Id. at 580.
113. Id. at 583-86.

In the jurisprudence of the common law, the ratio decidendi and the reasons for
a decision do not bind persons who are strangers to the litigation. The
importance of the ratio decidendi and the reasons for a decision is that they have
a precedential value in that they will be applied by the courts in other cases
involving strangers to the earlier litigation. iN

The court emphasized that the applicants were strangers to the earlier
litigation because they were not formally represented by the parties in
those lawsuits. The court additionally noted that the penultimate sentence
of Article 158(3) requiring courts to "follow the interpretation of the
Standing Committee" destroys the precedential value of judgments like
Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nfga, which had essentially been overruled
by the Standing Committee." ls As a result, the majority did not grant
relief to any of the applicants on this theory.
In his dissent, Justice Bokhary agreed that the reinterpretation by the
Standing Committee destroyed the precedential value of Ng Ka Ling and
Chan Kam Nga, and he noted the indubitable authority of the Standing
Committee to issue such a reinterpretation. But Bokhary reasoned that
there must be a good reason why the Basic Law provided that "judgments
previously rendered shall not be affected" by subsequent Standing
Committee interpretations. Bokhary concluded that the provision must
6
exist for circumstances like these-cases involving "crystallised rights." 1
Had the Standing Committee not made its Interpretation, Ng Ka Ling
and Chan Kam Nga would still be good law, and the applicants would
have benefited from the precedent they set. Once the Interpretation was
made, however, the precedential value was destroyed, and the conditional
nature of the court's rulings became apparent. Because of Article 158,
the parties in the two cases were entitled to their rulings, despite the
reinterpretation.
Bokhary argued that the judgments in the two cases retain some value
that is less than precedent, but more than an overruled case, because they
involve "constitutional litigation about an entrenched right.""1 7 The
Applicants are in a unique situation because their "circumstances
existing prior to the Interpretation fit the law as stated in the judgments
in Ng Ka Ling's case and Chan Kam Nga's case... [t]hey could have
joined in those cases."' 18
In my view, the nature of constitutional litigation about an entrenched right is
such that all the persons whose existing circumstances put them in the relevant
position acquire crystallised rights under a favourable judgment. The rival
arguments on this part of the case are as finely balanced as any I have encountered
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.at 585.
Id.
Id. at 656-57.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 654.
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in all my years at the Bar and on the Bench. I respect the opposite view. But
for my own part I feel unable
9 to restrict art.158's protection of crystallised
rights to named parties only."1
Bokhary argued that the court should not focus on "technicalities" where
crystallized rights were concerned. 120 Citing several cases which emphasized

the importance of context to judicial opinions,' 21 Bokhary reasoned that
the proper meaning of "judgments" was broader than the majority's
definition. In applying a judgment, Bokhary would consider the surrounding
122
circumstances and the reasoning of the judge.
Had the majority followed Bokhary's approach, it would have held
that because all the Applicants were Chinese nationals born in the

Mainland who had at least one parent who was a Hong Kong permanent
resident within categories (1) or (2) or Article 24(2) when the judgments
in Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga were delivered, all of the Applicants

had Hong Kong permanent resident status under the Basic Law as
123

interpreted by the Court in its judgments in those two cases.
The effect of such a ruling by the majority would have been to
legitimately sidestep the reinterpretation of the Basic Law. It would
have revived the independence of the judiciary, and would have drawn a

line around the power of the Standing Committee to reinterpret constitutional
provisions. Accordingly, the Standing Committee could reinterpret so
long as it did not significantly disappoint a legitimate public expectation
of this caliber.

Had the majority created a precedent of this kind, it would have
assured the citizens of Hong Kong a more predictable administration,

119. Id. at 656.
120. Id.
121. "[T]he generality of the expressions which may be found (in judicial
pronouncements) are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and
qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found."
Id. at 654-55(quoting Quinn v. Leathern, A.C. 495, 506 (1901); see also Moller v. Roy,
49 ALJR 311 (1975), 312; Australian Consol. Press Ltd. v. Uren, 1 A.C. 590, 595
(1969)- (holding that determination "should be interpreted widely... ")).
122. Id. at 656 (demonstrating how "technical arguments were advanced to the
effect that the court could not make a declaration at the instance of a respondent" in
Regina v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, exparte Shefki Gashi andArtan Gjoka, No.
CO/3559/1999, CO/4506/1999, 2000 WL 742056, at para. 6, however-the Honorable Mr.
Justice Collins held "the argument is a barren one since a formal declaration is
unnecessary when the judgment makes clear what the judge's view of the law is.").
Thus, "[n]o narrow or technical meaning was assigned to the word 'judgment' in that
context. Nor should anything of the kind be done in the present context.")). Id at 656.
123. Id. at 653-54.

and restored faith in their constitution and government. Citizens would
be able to rely on promises in their Constitution, and declarations made
by their government officials. Even if the Court held that the claimants'
legitimate expectations defeated China's reinterpretation, China would
likely have found a way to bypass the Court's maneuver. The reality is
that China's hunger to control Hong Kong is indefatigable. Even so, had
the Court held in favor of the Right of Abode claimants under a
legitimate expectation theory, it would have moved its king out of check,
so to speak, rather than surrendering so completely.
C. The Legitimate Expectation Issue
As a result of public statements and representations made by the
government to the Applicants, and the manner in which the Ng Ka Ling
and Chan Kam Nga litigations were conducted (test cases), the
Applicants argued that they had a legitimate expectation that they would
receive the same treatment as the parties in those two cases. 124 In
addition, because of the representations by the Legal Aid Department,
Applicants argue they were induced not to take the very action that
would have brought them under the judgments-previously-rendered
provision.' 25 The Applicants submitted that the Director of Immigration
failed to take account of these legitimate expectations when he made
orders for their removal from Hong Kong. Because he was bound by
law to do so, they argued that the orders should be quashed and the court
should exercise the relevant discretion itself, or allow the Director
of
126
Immigration to exercise his discretion in accordance with the law.
The majority opinion addressed the legitimate expectation issue by
tracing the history and substance of the doctrine through the common
law, and acknowledging that the doctrine is part of the administrative
law of Hong Kong. 2 7 The court began by making it clear that the
124. Id. at 587 (stating that applicants argued their legitimate expectation arose
from the two "test cases" and from "(1) public statements made by senior government
officials both before and after the two judgments; (2) representations made to individual
applicants by the Director of Immigration and the Legal Aid Department; and (3)
statements made and procedures adopted by judges and counsel during the course of
litigation leading to those judgments.").
125. Id. at 596.
126. Id. at 602.
127. Id. at 600 (discussing how the legitimate expectation doctrine was first
introduced by Lord Denning MR in Schmidt v. Sec'y of State for Home Affairs, 2 Ch.
149,171 (C.A. 1969)). The initial purpose was to "extend the range of rights and legal
interests ... affected by administrative determination so as to attract the rules of natural
justice."
Id at 599. "Early attempts to review for substantive unfairness an
administrative decision [denying] a legitimate expectation on policy grounds were
rebuffed by the English Court of Appeal." Id. (citing Regina v. Sec'y of State for the
Home Dep't and Another, exparte Hargreavesand Others, I W.L.R. 906, 921, 924-25

[VOL. 5: 465, 2004]

Hong Kong Right ofAbode
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.

doctrine does not preclude government agencies from changing or even
abandoning policies, subject to judicial review. The court then described
the four propositions or elements of legitimate expectation as summarized
in Regina v. London Borough Council of Newham, ex parte Bibi and AlNashed:
(1) When a government agency has made a promise or
representation which causes people to legitimately expect
that promise or representation to be honored, this
expectation must properly be taken into account in the
decision-making process, so long as doing so falls within
the power, statutory or otherwise, of the decision maker. If
the expectation is not taken into account, the decisionmaker has abused his power and acted unlawfully.' 28
(2) Effect should be given to these legitimate expectations
unless there are reasons recognized by law for not doing
so. Fairness requires that, if effect is not given to the
expectation, the decision-maker should express its reasons
so that they may,
be tested by a court should the decision
12
be challenged.
(3) Even if the decision involves the making of a political
choice based upon policy considerations, the decisionmaker must make the choice in the light of the legitimate
expectation of the parties.10
(4) If the decision-maker does not observe the third requirement,
the decision will be invalidated for failure to take account
of a relevant consideration, which amounts to an abuse of
power. Should the court identify such an abuse, it may ask
(1997)). At that time, "[t]he [English] Court of Appeal held that judicial review in such
cases was limited to Wednesbury unreasonableness." Id. "Since then, however, the
[English] Court of Appeal in a series of decisions has decided that judicial review for
substantive unfairness is not so limited" to the Wednesbury unreasonableness test, and
"in a case where official conduct has generated a legitimate expectation of a substantive
benefit, an administrative decision based on government policy which frustrates the
expectation may be reviewable on wider grounds, in particular substantive unfairness
and abuse of power." Id. at 563-64 (citing Regina v. N. and E. Devon Health Auth., ex
parte Coughlan, 2 W.L.R. 622 (2000); Regina v. Sec'y of State for Educ. and Emp., ex
parte Begbie, 1 W.L.R. 1115 (2000); (other citations omitted)'.
128. Regina v. London Borough Council of Newham, ex parte Bibi and Al-Nashed
I W.L.R. 237, at 248, 250 (C.A. 2001).
129. Id. at 251.
130. Id. at 252.

493

the decision-maker to exercise his discretion by taking the
legitimate expectation into account.' 3' The majority then
added its own qualification to the fourth proposition that
the court will invalidate such a decision only if the
decision is materially affected by the failure to take
account of a relevant consideration. 32
The first proposition presented a threshold question as to whether a
legitimate expectation existed. To be legitimate, an expectation had to
be reasonable' 33 and clear and unambiguous.1 34 In circumstances where
a representation was susceptible to competing constructions, the court
rejected the applicant's argument that the construction most favorable to
the applicant should be presumed, and held that it would accept the
public authority's own interpretation,
" subject to the application of the
"Wednesbury unreasonableness test. 135
To determine whether a legitimate expectation existed, the court
categorized the representations made by government officials to the
public, and made separate determinations for each. The three categories
were: (1) the four general statements made by the Director of
Immigration and the Chief Executive addressed to the public at large; (2)
The Legal Aid pro forma replies sent to applicants for legal aid; and, (3)
The letter of April 24, 1998, sent by the Secretary for Security in
response to letters of inquiry.
131. Id. at 248.
132. See Ng Siu Tung & Others v. Dir. of Immigr., [2002] 1 H.K. Legal Rep. &
Dig. 561, 601. (citing Lau Kong Yung & Others v. Dir. of Immigr., [1999] 3 H. K.
Legal Rep. & Dig. 778, 815; Regina v. Lord President of the Privy Council, ex parte
Page, A.C. 682, 702 (H.L. 1993); Nguyen Tuan Cuong & Others v. Dir. of lmmigr., I
W.L.R. 68, 77 (1997); Regina v. Cambridge Health Authority, ex parte B, I W.L.R.
898,907 (1995)).
133. Ng Siu Tung & Others v. Dir. of Immigr., [2002] 1 H.K. Legal Rep. & Dig. at
602. (citing Att'y-Gen. of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu, 2 A.C. 629, 636 (P.C. 1983).
134. Id. at 602 (citing Regina v. Inland Revenue Comrs., ex parte M.F.K.
UnderwritingAgents Ltd., I W.L.R. 1545, 1569-70 (Q.B. 1990); Regina v. Jockey Club,
ex parte RAM Racecourses Ltd., 2 All E.R. 225, 236 (Q.B. 1993); Regina v. Devon
County Council, ex parte Baker, I All E.R. 73, 88 (C.A. 1995) (cited with approval in
Regina v. North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan, 2 W.L.R. 622,
651 (2000)); Regina v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Unilever PLc, C.O.D.
421, 423 (1996) (stating the "requirement for an unqualified and unambiguous
representation" was described as "fundamental"); Hong Kong and China Gas Co. Ltd. v.
Dir. of Lands, [1997] 1 H.K. Legal Rep. & Dig. 1291, 1296-97).
135. Ng Siu Tung & Others v. Dir. of Immigr., [2002] 1 H.K. Legal Rep. & Dig. at
669. The "Wednesbury unreasonableness test" requires an administrative decision to be
impugned only if it is "so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could even have
come to it." Assoc. Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp, 1 KB 223, at
230, 234 (1948). In Regina v. Chief Constable of Sussex, exparte Int'l Trader's Ferry
Ltd., 2 A.C. 418, 452 (1999), the test was reformulated to be less restrictive by asking
"whether the decision in question was one which a reasonable authority could reach."
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Regarding the first category, the court determined that most of the
general statements that were made by the government before and during
put aside."'
the two "test cases" were "of no significance and may be
But the court decided that four specific, highly publicized statements
clearly represented to the public that the rulings of the court would be
followed and applied to similarly situated applicants. First, on July 13,
1997, the Director of Immigration said the government would do its best
to defend its case in accordance with the law, 137 and that if the
government lost its case it would "amend the legislation according to the
judgment."'' 38 Then, on July 23, July 31, and in October 1997, the Chief
Executive assured the people that, "[w]e [the government] would do
what the court eventually decides," and that "the Hong Kong SAR
will argue its case in court, and abide by the court's
Government
' 39
ruling."'
The court held that the fact that the speakers might not have intended
for people to act on their statements was "not to the point... [T]he only
point is: what did they mean?"'' 40 The court also held that these
representations amounted to a "clear and unambiguous statement that the
government would treat persons who fell within this category as if they
were parties to the litigation. 141 In addition, the representation did not
say anything about the possibility of an interpretation by the Standing
Committee, which could affect the decisions of the Court of Final
Appeal. The court held that these representations satisfied the threshold
issue, and that a legitimate expectation existed.
At this point, however, the court accepted the Director of Immigration's
argument that the applicants' expectation could not be substantively
enforced because such enforcement would be contrary to law, 42 and that
136.
598.
137.
138.

Ng Siu Tung & Others v. Dir. of Immigr., [2002] 1 H.K. Legal Rep. & Dig. at
Id. at591.
Id. at 591 (quoting the Director of Immigration as reported in the ORIENTAL

DAILY, July 13, 1997).

139. Id. (describing the Chief Executive's answer that there would be no need to ask
for a ruling beforehand when he was asked whether the Immigration Ordinance would be
sent to the Standing Committee for interpretation to clarify whether it was consistent
with the Basic Law).
140.

Id. at 598.

141. Id. at 604.
142. Id. at 606 (citing Att'y-Gen. of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu, 2 A.C. 629, 638
(PC 1983); Regina v. N. & E. Devon Health Auth., exparte Coughlan, [2000] 2 W.L.R.
622, at 647, 651, 656; Regina v. Sec'y of State for Educ. & Emp., ex parte Begbie, 1
W.L.R. 1115, at 1125, 1132 (2000).

the decision-maker could not satisfy an expectation by exercising his
' 43
statutory discretion "in a way which undermines the statutory purpose."'
The court concluded that although the Director of Immigration had
discretion under Sections 11,144 13,14' and 19(1)146 of the Immigration
Ordinance to allow people to stay on a case-by-case basis, he could not
allow all of the representees of the four general statements to stay
without undermining the entire legislative scheme. Further, because of
the potential size of the "large innominate class" (possibly 600,000),
there was no basis upon which the Director could rely to favor some, but
not others.147 As a consequence, the court held that the Director of
Immigration. could not lawfully exercise his discretionary powers in
favor of such a large class, and therefore the claim based upon the
general representations of the government failed.
Regarding the second category, in December 1998, shortly before the
hearing of Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga, the Legal Aid Department
screened applicants for the Right of Abode. Cases that were not
considered urgent were sent a pro forma reply:
Regarding your application for legal aid, please note the
following matters:
(1) Extension of stay
(2) Right of Abode
As your application for legal aid related to legal matters that
are being heard in the Court of Final Appeal at this time, there is
accordingly
no need to bring individual cases for litigation at this
48
stage.
The court agreed with the Applicants' argument that these written
replies caused them to refrain from lodging claims until after the test
cases were complete, and that this hesitation is the only reason they were
not in the same position as the parties to the test cases. 149 The court
143. Id. (citing Sedley L.J. in Regina v. Sec'y of State for Educ. and Emp., ex parte
Begbie, 1 W.L.R. at 1132).
144. Id. at 609. Section 11 gives the Director of Immigration the discretion to give
permission to land at Hong Kong.
145. Id. Section 13 refers to permission to remain in Hong Kong.
146. Id. Section 19(1) refers to the power to make or refuse to make a removal
order.
147. Id. at613.
148. Id. at 596. (stating these pro forma replies were sent to over 1,000 people
seeking legal aid).
149. The Legal Aid Department also made statements about the precedential effect
of the test cases, and discouraged applicants from commencing or joining in the
proceedings. This was done in an effort to limit the litigation to a manageable size.
Officials in the Legal Aid Department stated that the court's decisions in the
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found the representation clear and unambiguous, and the resulting
expectation was reasonable. The court also noted that these representations
were stronger than the ones in the first category, and the court held that a
legitimate expectation existed with regard to these representations.
Regarding the third category, while the Court of Appeal test cases
were pending, the Immigration Department and Secretary of Security
made specific written representations to people who had written
inquiring about the Right of Abode. 150 The Secretary of Security wrote:
The Court of Appeal will hear the case on 1 May. After the whole litigation
process is completed, the Immigration Department will follow the final
judgment of the Courts in dealing with the applications for the certificate of
Entitlement. 151

Although the court thought this representation was not as strong as the
one in the Legal Aid pro forma replies, it determined that it was a clear
statement that the final judgments of the courts would determine how
applicants for certificates of entitlement would be treated.
The court sided with the second and third category Applicants on this
issue of specific representations, distinguishing them from the representees
of the four general representations in the first category. Because these
specific representees constituted a "discrete and ascertainable class...
the exercise in their favor of the relevant discretionary powers would not
undermine the statutory policy as a whole."' 152 The court held that
although it was no longer possible to give effect to the original
legitimate expectation of the applicants, 5 3 it was possible to quash their
removal orders, and order the Director of Immigration to reconsider their
representative cases would become precedent for others similarly situated, and that all of
the cases did not need to be heard. These statements were reported in the press on July
15, 20, and 29, 1997. Id. at 594.
150. The Immigration Department's standard reply to these inquiries read, "The
SAR government has appealed against the High Court's decision on 26 January 1998
that children born outside of Hong Kong before their parents became HK permanent
residents also have Right of Abode if their father or mother received HK permanent
resident status afterwards. As litigation is ongoing, applications of persons in this
category cannot be given decisions for the time being." Id. at 593. The majority did not
consider this statement sufficient to support a claim of legitimate expectation because "it
did no more than state that, as the litigation was ongoing, decisions on applications for
Right of Abode could not be made for the time being." Id. at 598-99.
151. Ng Siu Tung & Others v. Dir. of Immigr., [2002] 1 H.K. Legal Rep. & Dig. at
593. (stating these responses were sent out Apr. 24, 1998).
152. Id. at613-14.
153. Their original expectation was that they would be treated as if they were a
party to the Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga cases. Id. at 594.

claims in light of their legitimate expectations.' 54 The court then
quashed the removal orders for the Applicants in the second and third
category.
The court's distinction between the first category of general
representees and the second and third categories of specific representees
is strained, at best. The court essentially holds that constitutional rights
will only be upheld when it is easy and efficient to do so. When the
group of claimants is too large, and managing their claims would be
time-consuming, their rights are less important. This rationale seems
suspiciously similar to the Hong Kong government's fear of a large
influx of immigrants. It is significant that the court mentioned that
nearly 600,000 Applicants could fall into the category of general
representees in category one. The court reasoned that there was no fair
way for the Director of Immigration to differentiate between those
general representees who deserve to stay, and those who do not. But
what else is the Department of Immigration for, than to make such
distinctions?
In his dissent Bokhary stresses the nature of the Chan and Ng cases as
"test cases." In Ng Ka Ling, the Chief Justice said, "These are test
cases." 55 Justice Bokhary himself in his Chan Kam Nga judgment said
that how the "time of birth" question was answered would affect not
only the named abode-seekers in that case but also "many other persons
now and in the future."' 156 The majority stated that no judge ever said
that the non-joined Applicants would be treated as if they were litigants
in the cases, and that no judge ever discouraged non-joined Applicants
from filing their own suits in court. But under the circumstances,
including intense media coverage and encouraging statements from the
Chief Executive and other top government officials, it was reasonable
for the public to expect that they would be treated like the litigants in the
Chan and Nga cases.
Bokhary went further to discuss the nature of test cases in general,
stating that the reasons test cases exist are to 1) preserve resources; and,
2) treat people in similar positions similarly.157 Citing R v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department,Bokhary quotes Lord Phillips of Worth
Matravers MR commenting on public law test litigation:
154. Id. at 614-15. The director of Immigration argues that even if expectation
were taken into account, it would not have materially affected the decision, and
therefore, the removal orders should not be quashed. Id. The court was not persuaded,
and the orders were quashed. Id.
155. Id. at 672 (quoting Ng Ka Ling & Others v. Dir. of Immigr., [1999] 1 H.K.
Legal Rep. & Dig. 577).
156. Chan Kam Nga & Others v. Dir. of Immigr., [1999] I H.K. Legal Rep. & Dig.
304, 308.
157. Id. at 672.
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In such circumstances, those who defer proceedings to await the result of the
test case will have a legitimate expectation that if the applicant in the test case
demonstrates that he is entitled
to a particular relief or treatment, they will be
58
treated in the same way. 1

Bokhary goes on to say that the Chan and Ng litigations were even more
than public law test litigation, because it was "constitutional litigation
about an entrenched right., 159 Moreover, the legitimate expectation was
based not only on the test case nature of the Chan and Ng litigations, but
also on express representations made by government officials.
The majority argues that many of the general representations, which
were made to the public before, during, and after the Chan and Ng
litigations, were too general to induce reliance by the public. Bokhary
contends that it is unbecoming for the government to assert that the
statements it chose to make for the purpose of reassuring the public were
too vague to do so. 160 He also adds that refusing to acknowledge the
plain meaning of public representations could amount to an abuse of
power in and of itself, and certainly could undermine public confidence
in government statements.16
V. CONCLUSION

The Court's assertion of judicial review in the Chan and Nga cases,
though correct, was perhaps ill-timed. The Court's challenge was to
persuade both China and the Hong Kong government to respect and
enforce the Court's decisions. Unfortunately, the Court chose a very
unpopular issue on which to take a stand. By taking the side of the
Right of Abode claimants, the Court effectively alienated itself from
China, the Hong Kong government, and even the citizens of Hong Kong.
Had the Court been more strategic and tactful, it might have avoided
provoking China's unequivocal censure. Perhaps the Court might have
waited for a case in which China approved of the Court's decision, and
as a companion to that decision, judicial review.' 62 In order to protect
158. Id. at 673 (citing R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p
Bajram Zeqiri. EWCA Civ. 342 at para. 43 (2001)).
In 1999, R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department was good law. Although the

case has since been reversed, Lord Philips' quote remains instructive regarding
Bokhary's reasoning in his dissent.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Compare with Marbury v. Madison, in which Justice Marshall aligned his

the constitutional and human rights of thousands of citizens, however,
the Court was
forced to claim a power of judicial review in the Chan and
63
Nga cases. 1
Having asserted the power of judicial review, it was a mistake for the
Court to implicitly withdraw that assertion by reversing itself according
to the Standing Committee's reinterpretation. As a result of the Court's
uncertain position, China arguably has more power over Hong Kong
than it did before. It appears that the Court will have a very difficult, if
not impossible time reasserting a power of judicial review over the
Standing Committee of China in the future. The Standing Committee,
on the other hand, established a precedent for overruling the Court by
reinterpreting the Basic Law.' 64
Ng Siu Tung makes it clear that the days of Hong Kong's independent
judiciary are over. The rule of law in Hong Kong now ultimately depends
on China's Standing Committee. Thus, Hong Kong's constitutional and
human rights are at the mercy of China's Standing Committee, and the
Communist Party.
The citizens of Hong Kong cheerfully gave up their independent
judiciary for fear of mass immigration of mainlanders into Hong Kong.
Instead of calling for a constitutional amendment which would have
stemmed the flow of immigrants from the mainland, the citizens of Hong
Kong watched while the Chief Executive worked with the Standing
Committee of China to extinguish the power of judicial review, and the
last independent voice for minority interests in Hong Kong.
Rather than use the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation or the "judgments
decision with what was politically popular in order to gain his opponents' acceptance of
judicial review. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally WILLIAM E. NELSON,
MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (2000).
163. One possible reason for the Court's impatience is that the foreign justice who
was brought into the Court for his independence might have been somewhat insensitive
to the Court's delicate position in relation to China. The presiding Judges were Li (Chief
Justice), Bokhary, Chan and Ribeiro (Permanent Judges) and Sir Anthony Mason (NonPermanent Judge). Sir Anthony Mason was Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia
from 1987 to 1995. See http://www.whitlam.org/people/mason-siranthony.html. Various
foreign judges participate as non-permanent judges in the Court of Final Appeal in order
to preserve the court's independence from China. See also http://www. judiciary.gov.hk/
en/organization/judges.htm.
164. The Basic Law provides for Standing Committee reinterpretation upon the
Court's request. THE BASIC LAW art. 158. The Right of Abode cases are significant
because the Standing Committee made its reinterpretations based upon a direct request of
Hong Kong's Chief Executive and LegCo-two branches of Hong Kong's government
which are very loyal to China. The Basic Law does not provide for reinterpretation
requests by the Chief Executive and LegCo. Id. The reinterpretation establishes
precedent for China to directly overrule the Court in any constitutional case because
China can order the Chief Executive and LegCo to make reinterpretation requests
whenever China wants to overrule the Court.
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previously rendered" clause of the Basic Law to validly circumvent the
Standing Committee reinterpretation, the Hong Kong Court of Final
Appeal surrendered its last weapons without a fight. Perhaps the Court
realized the inevitability of the Standing Committee's eventual victory,
and chose to simply accept it. Perhaps the Court trusts that such
reinterpretations will be a rarity, and that the Court in most instances
retains the power of final review. But of what value is a power of nearly
final review?
Once Hong Kong's judiciary has been stripped of its independence
and is nothing more than another "rubber stamp," who will speak up for
the constitutional and human rights of Hong Kong's citizens? How then
will those citizens differ from the students in Tiananmen Square who
tried to oppose China's tanks with words?
TERESA MARTIN
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